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A recent publication concluded that “… Canadian water transportation policy is 
a history of: laissez faire; protection, financing and subsidization; government 
operation, ownership and privatization; expanded protection; commerciali-
zation; and a market oriented philosophy.”1 Consistent with this larger policy 
process, subsidiary policy and regulation making for maritime safety and 
vessel-source pollution in Canada have followed the roller-coaster pattern, 
punctuated by parallel milestones. 
This contribution is a survey and analysis of current Canadian directions 
for domestic maritime safety and vessel-source pollution regimes. 
Contemporary Canadian policy and regulation making are guided by outcome-
based approaches formulated on the basis of risk assessment.2 The chapter 
seeks to identify and explain the reasons for contemporary Canadian policy and 
regulatory directions and the philosophy guiding them with reference to the 
broader international context. In particular, appropriate comparisons are drawn 
                                                 
* The authors are indebted to the following persons for their assistance with various research 
queries: Dr. Mary Brooks, Professor of Marketing and Transportation and William A. Black 
Chair of Commerce, Faculty of Management, Dalhousie University; Ross MacDonald, 
Manager, Special Projects and Arctic Shipping –AMSRP, Transport Canada; Valerie Devlin, 
A/Director, Seaway & Domestic Shipping Policy – ACFS, Transport Canada; Mark Covan, 
Senior Counsel (Practitioner), Public Prosecution Service of Canada, Atlantic Regional Office, 
Halifax, Nova Scotia; Bud Streeter, Vice President, Marine Manager for Canada, Lloyd’s 
Register North America, Inc.; Allan MacLean, Director, Conservation and Protection, Fisheries 
and Oceans Canada, Maritimes Region; David Michels, Dalhousie Law Library. 
1 J. Monteiro, and G. Robertson, “Milestones in Canadian Transportation Policy – Water and 
Highway – Part II” (Paper presented to the Canadian Transportation Research Forum, “North 
American Networks: Gaps and Opportunities,” Proceedings of the 42nd Annual Conference, 
Winnipeg, Manitoba, 3–6 June 2007), p. 580. 
2 At the time of writing the federal Department of Transport (Transport Canada) is planning to 
review the 1995 National Marine Policy and to update the Marine Safety “Strategic Plan for the 
period 2008–2015,” to be known as “The New Wave.” Valerie Devlin, Senior Advisor, 
Transport Canada, pers. comm. (26 June 2008). 
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with counterpart practices of the European Union. The foci include the 
Canadian approach to national maritime transport policy making, 
the institutional framework of Canada’s maritime administration, the process of 
reform of Canadian shipping regulation for maritime safety and marine 
pollution purposes culminating in a new shipping act, the strengthening of 
legislation and creation of penal offences to combat illegal ship discharges, 
places of refuge for ships in need of assistance, the use of shipping regulatory 
tools to address marine conservation concerns, supervision of classification 
societies, and the oil pollution liability and compensation regime. The study 






Bordering on three oceans (Atlantic, Arctic, and Pacific) and the Great Lakes, 
Canada is a major trading nation, but not necessarily a seafaring nation. 
The bulk of Canadian trade is with the United States, much of which is by way 
of surface transportation.3 Whereas maritime cargo in 2005 accounted for 39.7 
percent of the volume of Canadian international trade, it accounted for only 
12.5 percent of the total value of that trade.4 In addition, Canada has a very 
small flag fleet,5 having made a deliberate policy choice not to provide 
incentives for shipping (other than for shipbuilding and cabotage), thus relying 
on international shipping (generally foreign-flagged) to carry the majority of its 
                                                 
3 In 2007, approximately 59% of the value of trade with the United States was carried by trucks. 
Transport Canada, Transportation in Canada: An Overview (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works 
and Government Services, 2007), p. 5. 
4 Excluding trade with the United States, maritime traffic represented 45.2% of the value and 
83.2% of the volume of Canadian international trade. See WTO, “Trade Policy Review: 
Canada,” WTO Press Release No. PRESS/TPRB/280 (WTO, 21 March 2007), available: 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp280_e.htm> (retrieved 10 November 2008), para. 
159. See also Transport Canada, Transportation in Canada 2007 Annual Report Addendum, 
TP 13198E (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 2007) [hereinafter 
Transportation in Canada 2007], Tables “EC6: Modal Shares in Canada-United States Trade, 
1997–2007” and “EC7: Canada/Other Countries Trade, by Mode and Sector, 1997–2007.” All 
hyperlinks last viewed 12 November 2008. 
5 Transportation in Canada 2007, n. 4 above at Table M15: Canadian-Registered Fleet by 
Type, 1987, 1997, 2007. The Canadian fleet is comprised of 182 vessels with a total registered 
tonnage of 2.2M tonnes. Dry bulk carriers make up over half the tonnage (1M), with tankers 
(515) and ferries (428) sharing the remaining majority. 
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trade.6 Accordingly, Canada is a continental state in which “shipping is not 
something that appears to rank very high in government priorities even though 
it is an essential element of Canadian trade and economy.”7 That may still be 
true of commercial shipping. However, for risk assessment purposes, the 
increasing numbers and importance of fishing vessels and recreational boating 
registered and/or operating in Canadian waters have justified focused attention 
and new directions for Canadian maritime regulators. Every year there are 
many recreational boating accidents resulting in death, injury or property loss.8 
Another significant contextual factor for Canadian maritime 
transportation law and policy is the constitutional framework. Since 
confederation in 1867, navigation and shipping have been federal subject-
matter so that maritime legislation has essentially consisted of federal law, 
despite a period during which provincial law was applied in a maritime law 
setting.9 Canadian maritime law draws very heavily from international maritime 
law and its judicial development takes into consideration this essentially 
international character and the need for international uniformity.10 However, 
federal and provincial courts have generally common responsibilities for the 
administration of Canadian maritime law, irrespective of the location, types or 
flags of vessels involved.11 
 
 
                                                 
6 Transport Canada, A Shipping Policy for Canada, TP 1676 (Ottawa: Transport Canada, 
Marine, 1979), p. 1; see also Monteiro and Robertson, n. 1 above, p. 581 (Stating that “in 1949, 
the government concluded that Canada was not justified in maintaining a Canadian flag deep 
sea fleet via subsidies or preferential tax treatment for shipowners and operators, a policy which 
has not changed to date”). 
7 E. Gold, A. Chircop, and H. Kindred, Maritime Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003), p. 23. 
8 Every year some 150 persons die from boating accidents in Canada. See Transport Canada, 
Safe Boating Guide 2006, TP 511 (01/2008) (Ottawa: Transport Canada, Office of Boating 
Safety, 2008), p. 6, available: <http://www.fedpubs.com/subject/boat/safe_boating_guide.htm> 
(retrieved 30 March 2009). Statistics concerning accidents from other vessels are reported in: 
Transportation in Canada 2007, n. 4 above at Tables “S14: Marine Occurrences, 2002–2007” 
and “S17: Small Canadian Vessels Engaged in Fishing Activity Marine Occurrences, 1997–
2007.” 
9 Quebec North Shore Paper Co. v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 1054, McNamara 
Construction (Western) Ltd. v. R., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 654, and Zavarovalna Skupnost Triglav 
(Insurance Community Triglav Ltd.) v. Terrasses Jewellers Inc., [1983] 1 S.C.R. 283, followed 
by ITO International Terminal Operators Ltd. v. Miida Electronics Inc. (The Buenos Aires 
Maru), [1986] 1 S.C.R. 752, and Ordon Estate v. Grail, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 437. 
10 Gold et al., n. 7 above, pp. 115–117. 
11 Federal Courts Act, R.S., 1985, c. F-7, s. 22(1) & (3). 
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17.3. The Multiple Layers of Canadian Maritime Policy Making 
 
Canadian maritime policy has a problematique involving multiple layers of 
federal policy making processes. On one level, there is departmental policy, 
which is developed at the highest level of the department and frequently also at 
the unit level within the department. There are also policies of departments that 
share ocean responsibilities and which may overlap with the Department of 
Transport’s (Transport Canada) mandate, and that in turn may lead to inter-
departmental policies. Overarching departmental policies are national policies 
concerning sustainable development, modern comptrollership and other matters 
imposed on all line departments by the Office of the Prime Minister and/or the 
Treasury Board of Canada. For example, the Treasury Board’s Management 
Accountability Framework has had a far-reaching effect on the formulation of 
departmental policies, including maritime transport policy.12 
Although ostensibly setting out a framework for integrated oceans 
management, the Oceans Strategy13 and accompanying Oceans Action Plan14 
considered by other contributors in this project say very little about marine 
transportation generally, and maritime safety and vessel-source pollution in 
particular. This is partly explained by the difficulties faced by the Department 
of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) in performing its “integration” mandate as lead 
department under the Oceans Act,15 and partly due to a fundamental difference 
in marine culture between departments dedicated to oceans and fisheries on the 
one hand and maritime transport on the other.16 Although in public the federal 
institutional family tends to espouse interdepartmental cooperation, in reality 
Transport Canada has played a marginal role in DFO’s ocean policy initiatives.  
As with all federal departments, Transport Canada has its own national 
sectoral policy process, consisting of what may be described as macro and 
micro policies. In 2003 Liberal Transport Minister David Collenette announced 
                                                 
12 See generally Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, “TB Management Accountability 
Framework,” available: <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/maf-crg/index-eng.asp> (retrieved 
10 November 2008). 
13 Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Canada’s Oceans Strategy: Our Oceans, Our Future 
(Ottawa: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Oceans Directorate, 2002), available: <http://www.dfo-
mpo.gc.ca/oceans-habitat/oceans/ri-rs/cos-soc/index_e.asp> (retrieved 10 November 2008). 
14 Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Canada’s Oceans Action Plan: For Present and Future 
Generations (Ottawa: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2005), available: <http://www.dfo-
mpo.gc.ca/oceans-habitat/oceans/oap-pao/index_e.asp> (retrieved 10 November 2008). 
15 Oceans Act, S.C. 1996, c. 31. 
16 See A. Chircop, “The Regulation of Marine Transportation and Integrated Coastal 
Management: Two Management Approaches in Need of Integration,” in J. Norton Moore, Kuen 




“Straight Ahead - A Vision for Transportation in Canada,” a major macro 
policy that contained little new provision for the marine sector, but confirmed 
existing port divestiture, review with industry of benefits of marine 
transportation, evaluation of the provision of marine navigational services and 
continued participation in international shipping policy processes, notably the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and 
International Maritime Organization (IMO).17 Also at a macro level, the 
Department has its own Sustainable Development Strategy and Action Plan18 
outlining the strategic priorities, challenges, commitments, and performance 
measures for measuring success. The Department’s Sustainable Development 
Strategy (SDS) focuses on three areas (urban transportation, commercial freight 
transportation, and marine transportation) where the Department feels it can 
make a difference towards achieving sustainable development. In connection 
with marine transportation, the SDS states that the Department will address 
pollution from ship emissions (both atmospheric and marine) and from the 
presence of the ship itself, and identifies some of the major initiatives 
undertaken by the Department in that regard.19 However, it does not provide 
insight into how decisions regarding those initiatives are made. In addition to 
the macro policies, the Department has formulated problem-specific 
management responses that are in effect also policy decisions. These include 
the strategies for invasive alien species,20 places of refuge,21 Canada Shipping 
Act, 2001 compliance and enforcement, and safety and security culture.22 
                                                 
17 Transport Canada, Straight Ahead – A Vision for Transportation in Canada, TP 14054, 
online: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/publications/straightahead/vision/menu.htm> [hereinafter Trans-
port Canada, Straight Ahead]. 
18 Transport Canada, Sustainable Development Strategy 2007–2009, TP 13123 (Transport 
Canada, 2006), available: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/pol/en/acs/SD/sds0709/menu.htm> (retrieved 
10 November 2008). 
19 Major initiatives include: Business case for environmental incentive programme in the 
marine sector, shortsea shipping, skills and labour, transportation data and information and 
marine pollution control initiatives (sulphur emission control areas, ballast water management, 
HNS response, ship waste management/reception and aerial surveillance). 
20 Environment Canada, An Invasive Alien Species Strategy for Canada (Environment Canada, 
2004), available: <www.ec.gc.ca/eee-ias> (retrieved 10 November 2008). Fisheries and Oceans 
Canada, Canadian Action Plan to Address the Threat of Aquatic Invasive Species (Canadian 
Council of Fisheries and Aquaculture Ministers: 2004), available: <www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/ 
science/environmental-environnement/invasive_e.htm> (retrieved 10 November 2008).  
21 Transport Canada, National Places of Refuge Contingency Plan, TP 14707 (Transport 
Canada, 2007), available: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/MarineSafety/tp/tp14707/menu.htm> (retrieved 
10 November 2008). 
22 Transport Canada, Moving Forward: Changing the Safety and Security Culture, TP 14678 
(Transport Canada, 2008), available: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/tcss/StrategicPlan/menu.html> 
(retrieved 10 November 2008). 
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Transport Canada’s policy framework for the transportation industry in 
general is found in “Straight Ahead – A Vision for Transportation in Canada.” 
The document covers all modes of transportation, offering a framework to 
guide future transportation policy development and initiatives. In general, it 
emphasises a market-based approach to policy decisions in order to achieve 
“a better matching of investment decisions in infrastructure to user needs and 
offers.”23 In the context of marine safety and the environment, the document 
specifically supports the implementation of strategic plans formulated by 
Marine Safety, an important unit within Transport Canada.  
Marine Safety has produced two strategic plans (1997–2002; 2003–
2010)24 and is working on a third (2008–2015).25 The first plan, “The Way 
Ahead,” reflected the Department’s recent reorganisation and new oversight 
role. It focused on strategies that impacted Marine Safety’s internal 
environment and called for the modernisation and streamlining of the existing 
legislative regime (including the Canada Shipping Act and the Pilotage Act) to 
better reflect modern shipping practices. It also highlighted the need to maintain 
safety standards through more cost-effective means, i.e., the delegation of 
statutory inspection functions to classification societies and to formalise the 
consultation process and communication links within Transport Canada and 
between the Department and stakeholders. This entailed a renewal of the 
Canadian Marine Advisory Council, which is a key forum through which the 
various departmental units interact with stakeholders at the national level. 
The second plan, “The Next Wave,” continues the strategic direction set out in 
the previous plan and follows up on the implementation of the Canada 
Shipping Act, 2001, which had been adopted recently. The plan called for the 
development and enhancement of a comprehensive performance-based 
regulatory framework to enable the bringing into force of the Act. It also 
emphasised the need for a risk-based inspection regime, enhanced pollution 
prevention, development of a quality assurance programme and safety 
management systems, and promotion of a stronger safety culture within the 
marine industry. The plan also committed to the ongoing development of 
information systems to ensure data collection systems provide the best possible 
information for safety planning and decision making. At the time of writing, 
                                                 
23 Transport Canada, Straight Ahead, n. 17 above, p. 84. 
24 Transport Canada, Marine Safety Strategic Plan 1997–2002 (The Way Ahead), TP 13111, 
available: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/marinesafety/TP/TP13111/strategic-plan-1997-2002/ 
menu.htm> (retrieved 10 November 2008); and Transport Canada, The Next Wave: Marine 
Safety Strategic Plan 2003–2010, TP13111B (2003), available: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/ 
marinesafety/TP/TP13111/strategic-plan-2003-2010/menu.htm> (retrieved 10 November 2008). 
25 Transport Canada, The New Wave: Marine Safety Strategic Plan 2008–2015 (draft, 2008) 
[hereinafter Transport Canada, The New Wave]. 
 
 537 
Marine Safety is developing a third strategic plan, “The New Wave,” that will 
reflect the organisation’s increasing focus on small commercial vessels and 
tougher global pollution prevention regulations. It also recognises the growth 
and importance of the maritime labour market factors. The Plan further calls for 
strengthened risk-based decision making and the implementation of 
an integrated management system within Marine Safety. It also includes 
improvement of the regulatory framework by strengthening the consultation 
process, continuing a performance-based regulatory scheme, developing and 
implementing safety management systems for domestic shipping, and faster 
ratification of international instruments. 
Despite the various policy layers identified above, Canada does not have 
a dedicated and fully integrated marine transportation policy that includes 
directions for marine safety and vessel-source pollution. The National Marine 
Policy adopted in 199526 was not such a document as it focused, for the most 
part, on overhauling Canada’s overbuilt public infrastructure and its 
management on the basis of the principle of commercialisation. Consequently, 
the latter policy focused primarily on the re-organisation of the country’s port 
system and related legislation and led to the adoption of the Canada Marine 
Act.27 Although given general directions from higher policies, Canadian policy 
for maritime safety regulation and vessel-source pollution is fundamentally set 
at a departmental level, and more specifically at the unit level, i.e., Marine 
Safety, and formulated as strategic plans. Despite the series of strategy 
documents, there does not appear to be a straightforward policy plan, with clear 
and concise goals for marine safety and environmental regulation. On the 
environmental side the focus is on “sustainability”; on the safety side, the main 
focus is on safety management systems and accident prevention. Overall, the 
Canadian maritime regulatory framework is now less prescriptive and more 
focused on performance and risk management. Transport Canada’s shift toward 
greater focus on safety management reflects recognition that the regulatory 
approach does not ensure adequate risk management and adds a burden on the 
Department’s limited resources (e.g., enforcement).28 
 
 
                                                 
26 Transport Canada, National Marine Policy (Ottawa: Transport Canada, 1995). 
27 Canada Marine Act, S.C. 1998, c. 10. 
28 Moving Forward, TC’s safety management strategy, starts with the recognition that “an entity 
can comply with regulations without effectively managing risks to acceptable levels. A more 
comprehensive approach, which includes systematically understanding and managing risks and 
threats in the system, will enable us to make progress on our safety and security objectives.” 
Transport Canada, Moving Forward, n. 22 above, p. iii. 
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17.4. Evolution of the Maritime Legislative Framework and Canadian 
Ratification Pattern of IMO Conventions  
 
The contemporary sources of maritime law in Canada consist of federal 
statutes, case law and maritime law conventions to which Canada is a party. 
Canadian maritime law is federal law. Canada inherited the original structure of 
its maritime and admiralty law from English law.29 Much of Canada’s early 
maritime law consisted of 19th century English statutory law and case law, 
which was applied in the colonies, and generally received into Canadian law on 
confederation in 1867. Canada did not enjoy legislative powers over foreign 
affairs until the Statute of Westminster in 193130 and consequently the Canadian 
Parliament was limited in its ability to regulate shipping. With Westminster, 
Canada attained competence to deal with admiralty and shipping matters and in 
1934 enacted the Admiralty Act, 193431 and the first Canada Shipping Act.32 
British dominance of Canadian maritime legislation would continue well after 
this period.33 However, from 1931 onwards, Canada was in a position to further 
develop its policy and legislative framework for maritime matters generally 
through numerous amendments to the Canada Shipping Act and its eventual 
transformation into the Canada Shipping Act, 2001,34 the Marine Liability Act35 
and numerous other statutes listed in Table 17.1. Empowered by the Federal 
Court Act, which was adopted in 1971,36 Canadian courts would also embark 
on a case law development path that would part ways in many respects with 
English maritime law. 
                                                 
29 For a historical account of the historical origins of Canadian maritime law and jurisdiction, 
see generally Gold et al., n. 7 above at 114–110. 
30 Statute of Westminster, 22 Geo. V., c. 4. 
31 Admiralty Act, S.C. 1934, c. 31. 
32 Canada Shipping Act, S.C. 1934, c. 44. 
33 See T. L. McDorman, “The History of Shipping Law in Canada: The British Dominance,” 
Dalhousie Law Journal 7 (1982–1983): 620. 
34 Canada Shipping Act, S.C. 2001, c. 26 [hereinafter CSA 2001]. 
35 Marine Liability Act, S.C. 2001, c. 6. 
36 Federal Court Act, S.C. 1971, c. 1. The title of the Act would later be amended to Federal 




Table 17.1. Statutory scheme for maritime and related statutes in Canada 
 
Legislation Statutes 
Constitutional Constitution Act 
Judicature Federal Courts Act 
Maritime Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act 
Bills of Lading Act 
Canada Marine Act 
Canada Shipping Act 
Canada Transportation Act 
Coasting Trade Act 
Marine Insurance Act 
Marine Liability Act 
Marine Transportation Security Act 
Merchant Seamen Compensation Act 
Navigable Waters Protection Act 
Pilotage Act 
Safe Containers Convention Act 
Fisheries & 
Environmental 
Canada National Marine Conservation Areas 
Act 
Canada Water Act 
Canada Wildlife Act 
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 
Canadian Environmental Protection Act 
Fisheries Act 
Migratory Birds Convention Act, 1994 
Oil & Gas Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act 
Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord 
Implementation Act 
Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum 
Resources Accord Implementation Act 
Other Atomic Energy Control Act 
Bank Act 
Canada Labour Code 
Canadian Transportation Accident 
Investigation and Safety Board Act 
Nuclear Liability Act 
Oceans Act 
Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act, 1992 
 
The development of Canadian maritime law as it relates to safety, 
environmental and security considerations has in great part reflected 
commitments to international maritime conventions and generally the work of 
the IMO in developing these instruments, as well as the incremental 
development of technical standards and guidelines. The Canada Shipping Act, 
2001 includes as an objective to “ensure that Canada can meet its international 
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obligations under bilateral and multilateral agreements with respect to 
navigation and shipping.”37 The Act implements numerous international 
maritime conventions to which Canada is a party.38 Section 32(1) of the Act 
provides for referential incorporation of standards produced by international 
bodies through regulatory action. The Marine Liability Act essentially consists 
of principles and rules set out in international conventions to which Canada is 
or may become a party. 
Canada is not a party to all the IMO Conventions. On safety matters, 
Canada is a party to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 
1974 as amended (SOLAS),39 International Convention on Load Lines,40 
Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 
197241 and International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979,42 
but not to the 1978 and 1988 protocols of SOLAS.43 On vessel-source 
pollution, Canada is a party to International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships, 1973 as amended by the Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL) 
and Annexes I to III, but not to Annexes IV to VI.44 It is a party to the 
International Convention on Salvage, 198945 and International Convention on 
Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation, 1990 (OPRC), but not 
to the OPRC Protocol on Hazardous and Noxious Substances.46 Canada is not 
                                                 
37 CSA 2001, n. 34 above, s. 6(g).  
38 Id. (Schedule 1 lists 31 conventions as the responsibility of the Minister of Transport and 
Schedule 2 states two others under the responsibility of the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans).  
39 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, 1 November 1974, 1184 
U.N.T.S. 2, Institute of Maritime Law, The Ratification of Maritime Conventions (London: 
Lloyd’s Press, 1991–2003), Vol. I.3.20. 
40 International Convention on Load Lines, 1966, 5 April 1966, 640 U.N.T.S. 133, Institute of 
Maritime Law, The Ratification of Maritime Conventions (London: Lloyd’s Press, 1991–2003) 
Vol. I.3.50; Protocol of 1988 relating to the International Convention on Load Lines, 1966, 11 
November 1988, 2 U.S.T. 102, Institute of Maritime Law, n. 39 above, Vol. I.3.60. 
41 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972, 20 
October 1972, 1050 U.N.T.S. 16, Institute of Maritime Law, n. 39, Vol. I.3.250. 
42 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 27 April 1979, 1405 U.N.T.S. 97, 
Institute of Maritime Law, n. 39 above, Vol. I.3.280. 
43 Protocol relating to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, 17 
February 1978, 1276 U.N.T.S. 237, Institute of Maritime Law, n. 39 above, Vol. I.3.30; 
Protocol of 1988 relating to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, 11 
November 1988, U.S. Treaty Doc. 102-2, Institute of Maritime Law, n. 39 above, Vol. I.3.40. 
44 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 2 November 1973, 1340 
U.N.T.S. 184; Protocol of 1978 relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships of 1973, 17 February 1978, 1340 U.N.T.S. 61. 
45 International Convention on Salvage, 28 April 1989, U.K.T.S. 1996 No. 93. 
46 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation, 
30 November 1990, 30 I.L.M. 733; OPRC/HNS Protocol, Protocol on Preparedness, Response 
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a party to the International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling 
Systems on Ships, 2001,47 International Convention for the Control and 
Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments, 200448 and the recently 
adopted International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks, 2007,49 but has 
legislated rules and standards for ballast waters, anti-fouling systems and 
wrecks in navigable waterways.50 On damage liability and compensation, 
Canada is a party to the Protocol to Amend the International Convention on 
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969, 1992 (CLC)51 and Protocol to 
amend the International Convention on the Establishment of an International 
Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971, 1992 (IOPCF),52 but 
not to the Protocol of 2003.53 Recently Canada became a party to the 
Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976 (LLMC), as 
amended by the Protocol of 1996.54 Canada has not always become a party to 
international conventions that it has in fact implemented. For example, 
provisions of MARPOL and the LLMC were implemented in Canadian 
legislation long before Canada became a party to those instruments.  
There have been some departures from IMO international standards at 
various points in time. Canada did not become a party to MARPOL when this 
instrument came into force partly because it believed it had higher pollution 
                                                                                                                                  
and Co-operation to Pollution Incidents by Hazardous and Noxious Substances, 2000, IMO 
Doc. HNSOPRC/CONF/11/Rev 1, 15 March 2000. 
47 International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems on Ships, London, 
5 October 2001 (London: IMO, 2005) [hereinafter AFS Convention]. 
48 International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and 
Sediments, London, 16 February 2004, IMO Doc. IMO/BWM/CONF/36. 
49 International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks, Nairobi, 18 May 2007, IMO Doc. No. 
LEG/CONF.16/21. 
50 Navigable Waters Protection Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. N-22); Ballast Water Control and 
Management Regulations (SOR/2006-129); and Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution 
from Ships and for Dangerous Chemicals (SOR/2007-86). 
51 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 29 November 1969, 
973 U.N.T.S. 3, as amended by Protocol to Amend the International Convention on Civil 
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969, 27 November 1992, U.K.T.S. 1996 No. 87 
[hereinafter CLC]. 
52 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation 
for Oil Pollution Damage, 18 December 1971, 1110 U.N.T.S. 57, as amended by Protocol to 
amend the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971, 27 November 1992, 1996 A.T.S. 3. 
53 Protocol of 2003 to the International Convention on the Establishment of an International 
Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992, 16 May 2003, IMO Doc. No. 
LEG/CONF.14/20. 
54 Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976, 19 November 1976, 1456 
U.N.T.S. 221, as amended by the Protocol of 1996 to amend the Convention on Limitation of 
Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976, 2 May 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1433. 
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standards in its legislation. In relation to Arctic waters, Canada made 
a reservation to its ratification to MARPOL to safeguard the application of the 
Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act55 in the Canadian Arctic.56 This latter 
statute sets higher waste management and discharge standards in Arctic waters 
from ships for most ship-generated waste and anticipated the special power 
conferred on coastal states for ice-covered areas by Article 234 of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982,57 to which Canada is a party. 
 
17.5. Institutional Framework and New Directions for the Maritime 
Administration  
 
In principle and at law, Transport Canada is the maritime administration of 
Canada. In practice, functions related to maritime administration are shared 
among a number of federal government departments, forming a complex 
institutional mosaic.58 
A year after the adoption of the original Canada Shipping Act, Transport 
Canada’s first iteration was established in 1935 in response to the new 
challenges facing the organisation of national transportation.59 At this time, 
institutions responsible for Canadian railways, inland navigation and marine 
shipping were integrated and the Department of Transport Act, 1936 was 
adopted.60 Until 1994 Transport Canada performed a dual role that involved the 
“administration” and “management” of the transport system as well as 
developing the policy and regulatory framework. This was perceived to result 
                                                 
55 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. A-12 [hereinafter AWPPA]. 
56 International Maritime Organization (IMO), Status of Multilateral Conventions and 
Instruments in Respect of which the International Maritime Organization or its secretary-
General Performs Depositary or other Functions, as at 31 December 2005, IMO Doc. J/9193, 
p. 96 [hereinafter IMO]. 
57 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, UN 
Doc. A/CONF.62/122, 7 October 1982, 33 I.L.M. 1309. 
58 There are, in addition: (1) consultative bodies, such as the Canadian Marine Advisory 
Council and National Marine and Industrial Council; and (2) technical or function-specific 
bodies, including those established by statute, such as the Canada Transportation Agency, 
Marine Technical Review Board, Transportation Appeal Tribunal of Canada, Transportation 
Safety Board, and Ship Source Pollution Fund. Further, industry and transportation professional 
groups (e.g., Canadian Maritime Law Association, Shipping Federation of Canada, and 
Canadian Shipowners Association, among several others) are active participants in maritime 
policy and law-making processes.  
59 Transport Canada, Transport Canada: Our Story [1936–1946] (n.d.), available: 
<http://www.tc.gc.ca/publications/ourstory/1936-1946-menu.htm> (retrieved 10 November 
2008).  
60 Today this statute is the Department of Transport Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. T-18. 
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in a conflict of interest and it was decided that Transport Canada should focus 
primarily on policy and regulatory responsibilities. Thus, in 1994 Transport 
Canada was reorganised, the St. Lawrence Seaway and numerous ports were 
also transferred from Transport Canada to local authorities. Transport Canada 
also lost the Canadian Coast Guard to DFO, ostensibly in order to rationalise 
government and reduce costs through the merger of the two departments’ 
fleets.61 As a result, and at least until 2003, Transport Canada became less of 
an organisation focused on “administration” and “management” of operations, 
and became more focused on policy and regulatory functions. In late 2003, all 
marine safety policy and regulatory responsibilities were consolidated under 
this department. As a result, the Office of Boating Safety, the Navigable Waters 
Protection Act,62 and certain regulatory aspects of pollution prevention and 
emergency response, formerly responsibilities of other departments, were 
transferred back to Transport Canada.63 At this time, the Canadian Coast Guard 
remains attached to DFO, although as a special operating agency. Today 
Transport Canada is responsible for developing national transportation policies 
and programmes. Within Transport Canada, Marine Safety is the principal 
policy, regulatory and enforcement agency relating to ship safety and marine 
pollution prevention. Transport Canada is the lead agency under the Canada 
Shipping Act, 2001, the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, the Navigable 
Waters Protection Act, and the Canada Marine Act.  
DFO is tasked by legislation to lead and develop Canada’s national 
oceans strategy and integrated management planning for the marine 
environment. This department focuses on Canada’s economic, ecological, and 
scientific interests in oceans, including fisheries, hydrography, and marine 
services, and the coordination of federal policies and programmes respecting 
oceans.64 It shares jurisdiction with Transport Canada in many areas and is 
responsible for the administration and implementation of the Oceans Act and 
Fisheries Act.65 In particular, it is responsible under the Canada Shipping Act, 
2001 for dealing with pollution response.66 Operating under the DFO umbrella, 
the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) is the civilian federal agency responsible for 
patrolling Canada’s coastline, providing marine search and rescue, maintenance 
of aids to navigation, marine pollution response, and icebreaking services. The 
move to DFO led to low morale and caused operational difficulties possibly 
                                                 
61 Transport Canada, Transport Canada: Our Story [1986–1996] (n.d.), available: 
<http://www.tc.gc.ca/publications/ourstory/1986-1996-2.htm> (retrieved 10 November 2008). 
62 Navigable Waters Protection Act, n. 50 above. 
63 Transport Canada, The New Wave, n. 25 above, p. 4. 
64 Department of Fisheries and Oceans Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-15, s. 4. 
65 Fisheries Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-14 [hereinafter FA]. 
66 CSA 2001, n. 34 above at ss. 174.1, 179 & 180. 
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resulting from differences between its shipping culture and the fisheries 
development and management culture of its new home, as well as budget cuts 
in the name of rationalisation.67 
The Department of Environment (Environment Canada)68 is responsible 
for the administration of several statutes for the protection and conservation of 
Canada’s environment. Environment Canada has direct responsibility for 
marine pollution under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999,69 
Canada Water Act,70 Canada Wildlife Act,71 the Migratory Birds Convention 
Act, 199472 and the pollution prevention provisions of the Fisheries Act.73 
Environment Canada is the lead federal department on response and cleanup of 
up of hazardous wastes and oil spills. It operates in conjunction with DFO and 
Transport Canada in relation to several of its marine tasks. 
Given the complexity and overlap of legislative and enforcement 
authority within the federal government, it is not surprising that a great deal of 
coordination is required between the various agencies involved. For example, 
vessel-source marine pollution is enforced by Transport Canada Inspectors 
(CSA 2001), Fisheries Officers (FA), Environment Canada’s Enforcement 
Branch (CEPA), and the Canadian Wildlife Service’s Enforcement Branch 
(MBCA). Although some interdepartmental dialogue occurs at the legislative 
steering committee level, there appears to have been little effective dialogue 
and cooperation in the development of regulatory strategies and policy. Faced 
with overlapping and competing mandates, Transport Canada, DFO, and 
Environment Canada have concluded memoranda of agreement to cooperate on 
enforcement issues.74 
                                                 
67 See the testimony of Michael Turner, former Deputy Commissioner and Acting 
Commissioner of the Canadian Coast Guard in Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and 
Oceans, “The Coast Guard in Canada’s Arctic: Interim Report,” Fourth Report, June 2008, 
p. 36. 
68 Department of the Environment Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. E-10. 
69 Canadian Environmental Protection Act, S.C. 1999, c. 33 [hereinafter CEPA]. 
70 Canada Water Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-11. 
71 Canada Wildlife Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. W-9. 
72 Migratory Birds Convention Act, S.C., 1994, c. 22 [hereinafter MBCA]. 
73 Under an administrative agreement with DFO, EC has primary responsibility for the pollution 
prevention provisions of the Fisheries Act. Environment Canada, Compliance and Enforcement 
Report - Volume 1, available: <http://environnementcanada.gc.ca/alef-ewe/default.asp?lang= 
en&n=09ECE703> (retrieved 10 November 2008), Section 1. 
74 Some of the main MOUs signed to date are: TC/EC MOU respecting Enforcement (of the 
CSA 2001, AWPPA, MBCA and CEPA) (2006); TC/DFO MOU respecting Safety at Sea of 
Commercial Fishers (November 2006); TC/EC/DFO MOU respecting Enforcement in Atlantic 
Canada (2002); TC/DFO MOU and Resource Transfer Agreement (regarding transfer of the 
CCG policy responsibilities to TC) (3 March 2005); TC/DFO MOU respecting Marine 
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17.6. Selected Thematic Issues 
 
17.6.1. Maritime Safety 
 
Canada’s principal legislation concerning maritime safety is the Canada 
Shipping Act, 2001, which came into force on 1 July 2007. As mentioned 
earlier, the original Canada Shipping Act dated back to 1934, and since then it 
saw numerous amendments and add-ons, making the legislation voluminous 
and unwieldy. As McDorman noted, the underlying policy rationale tended to 
reflect former British imperial interests rather than the contemporary trading 
interests of a modern nation such as Canada.75 The legislation was also 
notoriously complex and inefficient, with over one hundred sets of regulations, 
making it difficult to enforce. Perhaps a major problem with the old legislation 
was its emphasis on regulation that required enforcement. For these and other 
reasons, a process of legal reform was commenced in 1997 and culminated in 
the adoption of the modern and streamlined Canada Shipping Act, 2001. 
The change has been described as a move from an inspection-based to 
a compliance-based regime, with a greater emphasis on a proactive approach to 
maritime safety and promotion of compliance.76 Since the adoption of the Act 
in 2001, regulations under the new act took years to modernise and re-enact 
through an ongoing consultative process with industry and other bodies, and the 
process continues today. With its many changes, the Act is touted as better 
suited to promoting safer, more efficient, and environmentally sound shipping. 
In fact, it takes into consideration the broader range of vessels in Canadian 
navigable waters (from pleasure boating to commercial vessels) and provides 
for modern operational safety and environmental standards. 
In the European Union (EU), a similar trend toward performance based 
legislation is observed, but Member States insist on following initiatives within 
the IMO framework. A point of divergence is in the provision of services, 
which in Canada is determined on a mixed risk-based decision making plus 
market-based approach (e.g., privatisation, user-pays). In comparison, in the 
EU, provision of services is generally governed by the EU rule on free 
provision of services (also market-based approach), but with certain exclusions 
for public utility services. In addition, there are differences between Member 
                                                                                                                                  
Transportation Safety & Environmental Protection (April 1996); DFO/EC MOU respecting 
administration of the Fisheries Act (1985). 
75 McDorman, n. 33 above, p. 651. 
76 Transport Canada, “Canada Shipping Act, 2001 ushers in new era of safety and protection of 
the marine environment,” News Release, No. H 133/07 (3 July 2007). 
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17.6.1.1. Delegation of Functions to Classification Societies and Their 
Supervision 
 
A major change introduced by the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 is the delegation 
of certain functions previously considered the exclusive reserve of the maritime 
administration. The EU also delegates certain tasks to classification societies. In 
Canada, the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 empowers the Minister of Transport 
with discretionary authority to delegate classification societies to issue 
Canadian maritime documents, carry out compliance inspections, and undertake 
audit inspections.77 To date, five classification societies have been authorised to 
do so.78 The move toward delegated statutory inspection was a specific 
commitment made in Marine Safety’s in “The Way Ahead” and was first 
implemented in 1998.79 In July 1999, prior to proceeding with the 
comprehensive “master” delegation agreements, Transport Canada signed 
agreements concerning certification for the International Safety Management 
(ISM) Code.80 Ships may enrol in the Delegated Statutory Inspection 
                                                 
77 CSA 2001, n. 34 above, ss. 12 & 13. 
78 Lloyd’s Register of Shipping (4 December 2000), American Bureau of Shipping (23 March 
2001), Germanischer Lloyd (10 September 2001), Det Norske Veritas (22 April 2002), and 
Bureau Veritas (31 March 2003). Transport Canada, “Delegation of Statutory Inspection and 
Certification” website, available: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/marinesafety/NPD/Intro-Text/ 
menu.htm> (retrieved 10 November 2008) [hereinafter Transport Canada, “DSI&C”]. 
79 Bill C-15, an Act to amend the Canada Shipping Act and to make consequential amendments 
to other Acts (1st Sess., 36th Parl., 46 Eliz. II., 1997), 1998, c. 16, s. 6, adding s. 317.1 to the 
Canada Shipping Act, 1985. At the time of passing only one political party, the New 
Democratic Party, opposed this move on the grounds that: a) “[p]rivatization of inspection will 
… increase bottom line pressures to cut corners to do things the cheap way rather than the safe 
way,” b) that the job of safety inspector will become a patronage appointment, c) that 
classification societies are often lax, and d) that a large amount of revenue generated through 
inspections will be lost to international players. House of Commons Debates, Second Reading 
of Bill C-15 (Edited Hansard, Debates No. 77: 19 March, 1998), p. 1105 (Bev Desjarlais), 
available: <http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=2332782& 
Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=36&Ses=1> (retrieved 10 November 2008) and House of 
Commons Debates, Third Reading of Bill C-15 (Edited Hansard, Debates No. 96: 30 April, 
1998), p. 1105 (Bev Desjarlais), available: <http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/ 
Publication.aspx?DocId=2332801&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=36&Ses=1> (retrieved 
10 November 2008). 
80 This was done under the Safety Management Regulations with the five delegated 
classification societies. Those agreements are now considered complementary to the “master” 
agreements. Transport Canada, “DSI&C,” n. 78 above. 
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Programme (DSIP)81 and thereafter its classification society becomes the sole 
issuing authority for the vessel’s certificates. The DSIP encompasses most of 
the surveys and certification required under the Act and regulations, including 
documentary requirements of international conventions to which Canada is 
a party.82 Although these moves suggest a comprehensive delegation of 
authority, in practice Marine Safety has retained sole issuing authority for 
several important documents.83 Further, Marine Safety retains authority to 
ensure that Canadian vessels comply with all applicable international and 
domestic requirements, and may monitor compliance through various 
administrative and executive measures.84 
 
 
17.6.1.2. Phasing-Out of Single-Hull Tankers 
 
The phasing-out of single-hull tankers from trading in Canadian waters has had 
to tie in to the requirements of the United States Oil Pollution Act of 199085 and 
subsequently the initiative to amend Regulation 13 of Annex I to MARPOL 
concerning existing and new tankers. The purpose was to improve the standards 
of existing and new tankers as a preventative measure to accidental oil pollution 
resulting from an incident, such as collision or grounding, or in a worse case 
scenario, a casualty at sea. As noted earlier, the bulk of Canadian trade is with 
its southern neighbour and therefore any major change to the conditions or 
transportation of that trade can be expected to affect Canada. Accordingly, 
Canada proceeded to implement the single-hull standard under the influence of 
the United States’ legislation as early as 1993 and further developed in 1995 to 
                                                 
81 Transport Canada, Delegated Statutory Inspection Programme, TP 13585E (Ottawa: 
Transport Canada, 17 December 2001), available: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/marinesafety/NPD/ 
Delegated-Statutory-Inspection/Revision-1-signed.PDF> (retrieved 10 November 2008) 
[hereinafter Transport Canada, DSIP]. 
82 Id., para. 3.2.4. 
83 E.g., Marine Occupational Safety and Heath requirements; Safety Convention certificates on 
passenger vessels; extending inspection intervals or certificates more than two months beyond 
the due date; exemption of certificates; revoking a certificate; any statutory function or 
inspection not explicitly transferred. Transport Canada, DISP, n. 79 above, paras. 3–4. 
84 E.g., administrative reviews of the delegated organisation’s reports and records; announced 
and unannounced verification inspections (of a scope comparable to a port state control 
inspection); dry-dock examinations; marine casualties and damage surveys; liaison with the 
delegated organisation; and audit of delegated organisation’s shore operations. Id. 
85 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. 2701, et seq. See the US Coast Guard Interim Final Rule 




apply to both Canadian ships and non-Canadian ships trading in Canadian 
waters, including the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).86 Following the loss of 
the Erika and subsequently the Prestige off the coasts of France and Spain 
respectively, the IMO was urged to accelerate the phasing out of single-hulls 
and to bring international standards more in line with the Oil Pollution Act of 
1990 through further amendments to MARPOL.87 In addition to an accelerated 
phase-out for single-hulls, heavy grade oils (HGOs) were banned from carriage 
by single-hulls being phased out and the Condition Assessment Scheme for 
these ships was extended.88 
Despite what appeared to be a convergence of international standards for 
single-hull tankers and the oil trade, which had suffered a seismic split with the 
Oil Pollution Act of 1990, there continued to be differences between the 
regulations under the Act and the revised MARPOL Annex I regulations. This 
was a divergence that Canada obviously could not ignore. Hence, Canadian 
regulations on single-hull phase-outs have had to apply two parallel regimes. 
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 requirements continue to be applied to certain 
existing tankers, notably those trading with the United States,89 whereas others 
are to be governed by the amended MARPOL Annex I standards.90 In contrast, 
the EU has a single regime governed by the amended MARPOL to accelerate 
the phase-out, which was largely at the behest of the EU. 
                                                 
86 Oil Pollution Prevention Regulations, SOR/03-3, at s. 14.2: “Any oil tanker that is engaged in 
voyages that take place in waters under Canadian jurisdiction shall comply with Standards for 
the Double Hull Construction of Oil Tankers, TP 11710, published by the Canadian Coast 
Guard on July 6, 1993, as amended from time to time, other than sections 3 and 5 and 
subparagraphs 24(a)(i), (b)(i) and (c)(i) of those Standards.” Superseded by Regulations for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships and for Dangerous Chemicals, SOR/2007-86, s. 54 et. seq. 
87 Specifically Regulations 13F, 13G and 13H to Annex I for new tankers and existing large 
tankers. Following Erika, amendments to Regulation 13G resolution MEPC.95(46) included 
smaller tankers and brought MARPOL closer in line with the US OPA 1990 in order to bring 
the international requirements more in line with OPA 90 requirements by 2015. However, with 
Prestige in 2002, Regulation 13G was amended further and a new Regulation 13H was 
introduced accelerating the phase-out, among other.  
88 IMO, Resolutions MEPC.111(50) and MEPC.112(50). 
89 In particular the following: “Canadian tankers on domestic trade or only trading to the U.S.; 
U.S. tankers trading only to Canada or in transit through waters under Canadian jurisdiction; 
Canadian tankers that are less than 5000 DWT, except tankers over 600 DWT on international 
trade carrying heavy grade oil as cargo; non-Canadian tankers on the coasting trade; non-
Canadian tankers on international trade calling at Canadian ports that are less than 5000 DWT, 
except tankers over 600 DWT carrying heavy grade oil as cargo.” Transport Canada, Standards 
for the Double Hull Construction of Oil Tankers, TP 11710 (Ottawa: Transport Canada, 6 July 
1993, rev. 5 April 2005). 
90 Id., namely: “Canadian tankers over 5000 DWT requiring international certification; non-
Canadian tankers over 5000 DWT on international trade in waters under Canadian jurisdiction; 
tankers over 600 DWT on international trade carrying heavy grade oil as cargo.” 
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17.6.1.3. Use of Safety Regulatory Tools for Marine Environmental Protection 
and Conservation Purposes 
 
Canada has used regulatory tools normally reserved for the regulation and 
management of navigation safety for the purpose of achieving marine 
environmental protection and conservation objectives. This type of regulation 
relates to restrictions and controls on the movement of vessels, or the conditions 
of that movement, and may be of a mandatory or recommendatory nature. This 
is a function that rests in DFO and is carried out by the Canadian Coast 
Guard.91 The utilisation of these tools for protection and conservation purposes 
has provided Canada with the management and enforcement tools needed 
without necessarily resorting to the designation of a particularly sensitive sea 
area (PSSA) through the IMO, as has been the case in several other regions, 
including the marine areas of EU Member States in the Baltic Sea, Canary 
Islands region, North Sea (Wadden Sea), and Western European Waters. To 
date, there has been only one instance of a PSSA being mooted within the 
Canadian federal government, specifically in connection with oil pollution 
incidents and consequent bird mortality in the northwest Atlantic off 
Newfoundland.92 As it turned out, rather than proceeding the PSSA path, the 
federal government passed amendments to the Migratory Birds Convention Act 
and Canada Shipping Act, 2001, which toughened the sanctions for oil 
pollution offences. In general, there are a number of instances where safety 
regulation has been employed for marine environmental protection and 
conservation purposes, and in particular in two types of situations.  
                                                 
91 Under the former Canada Shipping Act, s. 125. In 1996 pursuant to the Public Service 
Rearrangement and Transfer of Duties Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-34, responsibility for vessel 
traffic and marine navigation services under s. 562.15-562.20 and 517-525 of the CSA 1985 
was transferred to DFO. TC/DFO, MOU respecting Marine Safety & Environmental Protection 
(April 1996), n. 74 above, s. 2, available: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/MarineSafety/TP/mou/ 
menu.htm> (retrieved 10 November 2008).  
92 Although not PSSAs, it should be noted that DFO has designated seven “Marine Protected 
Areas” (MPAs) under the Oceans Act, five in Eastern Canada: The Musquash Estuary (7 March 
2007), Basin Head (PEI) (11 October 2005), Gilbert Bay (11 October 2005), Eastport 
(11 October 2005), The Gully (14 May 2004); and two off the Pacific coast: Bowie Seamount 
(21 April 2008), Endeavour Hydrothermal Vents (7 March 2003). Fisheries and Oceans 
Canada, “Marine Protected Areas,” available: <http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/oceans/marineareas-
zonesmarines/mpa-zpm/index-eng.htm> (retrieved 10 November 2008). The system of MPAs is 
also complemented by “Marine Wildlife Areas” established by Environment Canada and 
“National Marine Conservation Areas” established by Parks Canada. Again, there are no PSSAs 
established with regard to any of these. The departments and agencies are coordinated by the 
Federal Marine Protected Areas Strategy (Ottawa: DFO, 2005), available: <http://www.dfo-




The first concerns the requirement of use of automatic identification 
system (AIS), now an IMO international standard and which, while enabling 
the identification of the location of a vessel for the purposes of traffic regulation 
and search and rescue, also assists aerial surveillance of potential polluters and 
evidence for prosecutions.93 Information concerning the identity and course of 
the ship is relayed to coastal authorities on a real-time basis and has enabled 
more efficient use of limited surveillance resources. The reporting of a slick 
may thus be traced to a vessel that may have been navigating the area. In 
another application, a fishing vessel that appears to be undertaking irregular 
movement at a slow speed in a marine protected area may also suggest that 
illegal fishing may be taking place.  
The second situation concerns the conservation needs of a particular 
species and protection of its habitat, possibly on a seasonal basis. In the Atlantic 
region this has occurred in the form of change to the shipping lanes in the 
Canadian sector of the Bay of Fundy to protect the North Atlantic Right Whale 
population from ship strikes, a major cause of premature mortality for this 
endangered species. Studies of sightings between 1987–2000 suggested that the 
shipping lanes in the Bay of Fundy were in direct conflict with areas where 
major aggregations of this species occurred, and that a slight adjustment to the 
location of the lanes in the traffic separation scheme in the area could 
significantly reduce the ship strikes.94 A proposal was made to the IMO and 
after consideration by the Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation (NAV), 
the proposed changes were adopted. The changes were made as part of the 
North Atlantic Right Whale Recovery Plan led by DFO95 after a joint 
government-industry working group concluded that the most cost effective way 
of reducing strikes (by as much as 80 percent) while maintaining safe 
commercial navigation was to shift ship traffic flow in areas of highest whale 
density.96 The success of this initiative led to a similar proposal for the 
                                                 
93 Pursuant to the Navigation Safety Regulations, all vessels over 300 tons on international 
voyages and domestic trade ships of 500 GT or more except fishing vessels must carry AIS. 
Navigations Safety Regulations, SOR/2005-134, s. 65 (entered into force 10 May 2005). In the 
EU, reporting is regulated by Directive 2002/59/EC on Community Vessel Traffic Monitoring 
and Information System. 
94 IMO, Doc. NAV 48/3/5 (5 April 2002). 
95 Transport Canada, “Bay of Fundy Shipping Lanes Moved to Protect Right Whale,” News 
Release, No. A017/02 (19 December 2002), available: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/ 
releases/atl/2002/02_A017e.htm> (retrieved 10 November 2008). The new lanes were approved 
by IMO in December 2002 and became effective 1 July 2003. 
96 Transport Canada, “New Bay of Fundy Shipping Lanes to Protect Right Whale come into 
effect,” News Release, No. A007/03 (26 June 2003), available: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/ 
mediaroom/releases/atl/2003/03-A007e.htm> (retrieved 10 November 2008). See also 
Guidelines for Vessel Traffic Services, IMO Assembly Res. A.857(20) (27 November 1997); 
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Roseway Basin. Again with the conservation needs of the North Atlantic Right 
Whale in mind, in 2007 Canada proposed to the IMO that the Roseway Basin, 
located off southeastern Nova Scotia, be designated as a seasonal area to be 
avoided (ATBA).97 The proposal was adopted by the IMO’s MSC in October 
2007 for ships 300 GT or more and takes effect from June 1st to December 31st 
each year.98 
On a related point, Canada has often used the powers under the Navigable 
Waters Protection Act to have sunken vessels and wrecks removed where they 
pose hazards to navigation or even constitute a threat to the marine 
environment. Although Canada is not yet a party to the recently adopted 
Nairobi International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks, 2007, it has been 
urged to do so to enable Transport Canada to undertake the removal of derelict 
vessels.99 Transport Canada proposes to amend the Act to implement the 
operational elements of the Convention.  
 
 
17.6.2. Vessel-Source Pollution 
 
17.6.2.1. Regime for Pollution Offences 
 
Canada’s approach to the regulation of marine pollution has been aptly 
summarised as follows: “Canada has created its marine environmental 
legislation through a series of uncoordinated statutes, each attempting to put an 
end to intentional marine pollution. Overlapping offences is unnecessary and 
useless.”100 This is indeed the situation in Canada—an extensive system of 
                                                                                                                                  
and generally, Ships’ Routeing, 9th ed. (London: IMO, 2008), IX/2. On the US side, see the 
Reporting Systems for Protection of Endangered North Atlantic Right Whales in Sea Areas off 
the North-Eastern and South-Eastern Coasts of the United States. Id., G/I/18-1-3. 
97 Transport Canada, “Canada’s New Government is Vigilant in the Protection of Endangered 
North Atlantic Right Whales,” News Release, No. A 008/07 (10 October 2007), available: 
<http://www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/releases/atl/2007/07-a008e.htm> (retrieved 10 November 
2008). IMO Ships’ Routeing, n. 96 above, II/1. 
98 Id. See also IMO, Guidelines for Vessel Traffic Services, n. 96 above. 
99 House of Commons, Consideration of Proposed Amendments to the Navigable Waters 
Protection Act, Report of the Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and 
Communities (June 2008), available: <http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication. 
aspx?DocId=3566517&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=39&Ses=2> (retrieved 10 November 
2008). 
100 J. O’Connor, “The Enforcement of Marine Pollution Legislation in Canada” (Paper 




statutes that establish overlapping sanctions legitimated by several statutes and 
for what amounts to the same offence (see Annex below). Moreover, there has 
been a consequent and not unexpected overlap, if not duplication, of 
institutional responsibilities among the various federal departments concerned. 
The EU, unlike Canada, has a single Ship Source Pollution Directive 
(2005/35/EC) to be implemented by all Member States. Nevertheless, there are 
similar underlying concerns in both systems regarding the criminalisation of 
seafarers and corporate and vicarious liability.  
Canada has been regulating vessel-source pollution utilising criminal and 
civil law tools ever since its implementation of OILPOL.101 In 1971 and 1984, 
comprehensive marine pollution provisions, including higher penalties, were 
added to the Canada Shipping Act.102 The Canada Shipping Act, 2001 is the 
principal statute now implementing international conventions addressing 
vessel-source pollution to which Canada is a party, such as MARPOL 73/78,103 
whereas civil liability and compensation are addressed by the Marine Liability 
Act, which is discussed below. The Canada Shipping Act, 2001 provides for 
summary conviction procedures with substantial penalties for the most serious 
contraventions, such as illegal discharge of pollutant, failure to have or to 
implement oil pollution prevention or emergency plans, or failure to obey 
instructions resulting from a discharge. Less serious offences, such as failure to 
have response, emergency or prevention plans on site or failure to provide 
                                                 
101 The Canada Shipping Act was amended in 1956 to give effect to the OILPOL Convention. 4 
& 5 Eliz. II, c. 34 (Can). The Minister of Transport was authorised to draft regulations giving 
effect to the Convention and to “prevent pollution by oil from ships of any mainland, minor or 
other waters of Canada.” Such regulations were adopted in 1960: Oil Pollution Prevention 
Regulations, SOR 60-70, adopted 24 February 1960. Offenders were punished with a fine of up 
to CAD500 or imprisonment up to 6 months, or both. CSA 1956, s. 495A. 
102 House of Commons Debates 1970, Vol. I, at 519 (Donald Jamieson (Minister of Transport)). 
Among the various amendments, the fines for illegal discharge and failure to report a discharge 
were increased to CAD100,000 to make crews and masters “more conscious of their 
responsibilities” to the environment. Prior to that, the maximum fines that could be imposed on 
the master, owner or person responsible for the unlawful spillage of oil from a vessel was 
CAD5,000 (Source: Oil Pollution Prevention Regulations, s. 5; Garbage Pollution Prevention 
Regulations, s. 4; Pollutant Substances Regulations, s.4). Imprisonment penalties were removed 
from the section without any apparent explanation. The fines were increased again in 1984 to 
CAD200,000 and to CAD250,000. Bill C-75, an Act to Amend the Canada Shipping Act and 
the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act. House of Commons Debates 1983–84, pp. 14263-5. 
103 Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships and for Dangerous Chemicals 
(SOR/2007-86), implementing MARPOL Annex I, II, IV, V and VI, the Code for the 
Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk, 1971 (BCH 
Code), the International Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying 
Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk (IBC Code), and the AFS Convention, n. 47 above, in all 
Canadian waters although stricter requirements are often required for inland waters. 
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information when requested, may result in lower fines.104 These provisions 
were greatly influenced by consultations with the shipping industry, so that all 
but one of the stated offences were made subject to summary conviction.105 
Since 2004, Transport Canada has overall responsibility for enforcement of the 
pollution prevention provisions, while DFO is responsible for pollution 
response provisions. 
Despite the apparent stringent pollution provisions, ongoing illegal 
discharges of oily ballast and waste engine room oil in Canada’s EEZ in the 
Atlantic resulted in significant seabird mortality. The federal response to this 
problem was Bill C-15 amending the Migratory Birds Convention Act and the 
Environmental Protection Act. Bill C-15 was enacted to protect migratory birds 
and prevent oil pollution discharges from vessels by “expanding the zone where 
[Canada] can operate, bringing in tougher penalties and ensuring better 
protection for [Canadian] officers in the field.”106 The legislation was triggered 
by the perceived failure of the enforcement regime following the Tecum Sea 
incident. The Tecum Sea was observed trailing an oil slick, but charges against 
the vessel and master were dropped after several legal gaps were identified and 
a turf war between the various federal departments with related mandates could 
not be resolved.107 During parliamentary deliberations, it was further noted that 
it was essential to extend Canadian law to its EEZ and to bring its sanctions in 
line with those imposed by courts in the United States because the vast majority 
of vessels were simply transiting the Canadian EEZ while trading to or from 
that country.108 Because this trade did not include port entry in Canada, there 
                                                 
104 Penalties for serious offences are up to CAD1million in fines or 18 months imprisonment, or 
both, other offences are subject to fines of up to CAD100,000 or 1 year imprisonment, or both. 
CSA 2001, n. 34 above, ss.183–184, 187–188. 
105 The only exception is found in s. 253(1), intentionally or recklessly causing a disaster that 
results in the loss of life or serious damage to the environment, for which the guilty person may 
be liable on conviction on indictment to a fine (without maximum limits) or to imprisonment up 
to five years, or both. CSA 2001, n. 34 above, s. 253(1). 
106 Bill C-15 an Act to amend the Migratory Birds Convention Act, 1994, and the Canadian 
Environmental Protection Act Discussion (Standing Committee on Environment and 
Sustainable Development (ENVI) Evidence, 4 November 2004), available: 
<http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/cmte/CommitteePublication.aspx?SourceId=125178#T1020> (retrieved 
10 November 2008), per Hon. Stephan Dion (Minister of Environment), p. 1035. 
107 Id., p. 1040 per Mr. Bryon Wilfert (M.P.) The members also highlighted the need for 
an adequate enforcement budget, in particular Mr. Nathan Cullen (M.P.) stated that: “I want to 
put the fear of God into some of these captains so that they know there’s a good chance they’re 
going to be inspected,” because these enforcement difficulties apparently resulted in a culture 
within the shipping community that “if you’re going to spill, you spill in Canada, because (a) 
they won’t find you, and (b) if they do find you, they won’t fine you.” Id., p. 1055. 
108 Id., p. 1055, per Trevor Swerdfager (Director General, Canadian Wildlife Service, 
Environmental Conservation Service, Department of the Environment). 
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was a perceived gap in the exercise of port state and coastal state enforcement. 
The federal government justified the tougher sanctions in the interest of 
conformity with the contemporary shipping business, change of the risk-benefit 
assessment of polluting, and harmonisation of sanctions with those imposed in 
the United States to ensure that polluters no longer enjoy safe haven.109 
Political will ensured that the proposed legislation passed, but concerns 
were expressed. The role of Environment Canada as the lead agency was 
clarified. The power of arrest, entry, search and seizure, detention, and direction 
of movement to vessels in the Canadian EEZ was extended.110 Tougher 
sanctions were introduced and new penalties for tampering with or destruction 
of records were added to penalties for discharges, all to deter shipowners and 
operators from discharging pollutants in Canadian waters.111 There were issues 
of consistency with MARPOL commitments. At the same time, Courts were 
provided with sentencing guidelines.112 The bill contained hasty and vague 
drafting and could have given better consideration to the problem of legislative 
and institutional overlaps in Canada’s vessel-source pollution regime.  
Most significantly, strict and vicarious liability provisions applicable to 
masters and chief engineers, owners, operators, or directors of the corporate 
owner, with imprisonment as penalty, was legislated.113 The hope was that 
these measures would encourage whistle-blowing and strengthen the 
evidentiary base for the prosecution of offences. The new criminal offences 
                                                 
109 In a subsequent declaration, the Minister of Environment added: “The European Union is 
preparing legislation that will have about the same effect as Bill C-15. We are going in the same 
direction according to international law and international morality.” Hon. Stephan Dion, 
“Announcing the proclamation of the Migratory Birds Convention Act and the Canadian 
Environmental Protection Act as Amended by Bill C-15” (St. John’s Newfoundland, 25 June 
2005), available: <http://www.ec.gc.ca/media_archive/minister/speeches/2005/050625_s_ 
e.htm> (retrieved 10 November 2008). 
110 MBCA, n. 72 above, s. 2.1 and 18.3. 
111 The MBCA now provides for convictions on indictment a maximum fine of CAD1 million 
and, if the vessel is over 5000 DWT a minimum of CAD500,000, and imprisonment for up to 
three years, or both, for vessels caught depositing o permitting harmful substances to be 
deposited, whether accidental or intentionally, regardless of amount, in areas frequented by 
migratory birds. The same punishment is applicable for the destruction or alteration of the 
vessel’s records. The only defence available is that of due diligence. MBCA, n. 72 above, s. 
13(1.1), 13(1.11), 13(1.8). 
112 Id., s. 13(4.1). 
113 Id., s. 5.4-5.5 and 13(1.6)–13(1.7). Under the MBCA, the accused must establish that he 
took all reasonable care to avoid the commission of the offence by others on board the vessel; 
such vicarious strict liability is unprecedented in Canadian law. S. Kirby, “The Criminalization 
of Seafarers Involved in Marine Pollution Incidents” (2008) (unpublished), p. 24. Corporate 




could potentially infringe on the human rights of seafarers, who are invariably 
more visible than the shipowners. However, no such convictions have as yet 
occurred.114 While much has been said about the rising trend of criminalisation 
of seafarers in Canada, it would appear that seafarers have been faced with the 
prospect of criminal liability for such offences since the inception of marine 
pollution regulation. Although there was a brief period during the 1970s in 
which shipping interests succeeded in removing the possibility of imprisonment 
for pollution offences, the victory was only brief, and perhaps the only 
remaining example of such legislation is found in the Arctic Waters Pollution 
Prevention Act (AWPPA). 
Vessel-source pollution offences are also established and enforced under 
other statutes. Contemporaneous and parallel amendments to the Canadian 
Environmental Protection Act, 1999 establish similar sanctions for the disposal 
or incineration of polluting substances at sea, import or export of pollutants for 
disposal at sea, and the loading of a substance onto a ship for disposal at sea, 
unless done with a permit.115 As mentioned earlier, vessel-source pollution 
prosecutions may also be pursued under the Fisheries Act, implementation 
responsibility for which rests with DFO, and enforcement with Environment 
Canada. The Act prohibits “throwing prejudicial or deleterious substances 
overboard” or depositing such substances in fish habitats.116 It also establishes 
a duty to report an incident of pollution and to take measures to minimise the 
effects.117 Tough sanctions similar to those under the AWPPA and CEPA are 
imposed, possibly because of the socio-economic significance of fisheries for 
the Canadian economy. The Canada National Marine Conservation Areas 
Act,118 provides similar offences and sanctions for discharges in conservation 
                                                 
114 Kirby, id., p. 25, citing pers. comm. with James Martin, Federal Department of Justice 
(20 May 2008). 
115 CEPA, n. 69 above, Part VIII, Div. 3 – Disposal at Sea and s. 272. In addition, CEPA 
contains a broad prohibition against intentional or reckless damage to the environment (causing 
a disaster) and risk of death or harm to person, contravention of which may be punished on 
indictment by a fine without maximum limits and/or up to five years imprisonment or on 
summary conviction with a fine up to CAD300,000 or imprisonment up to six months, or both. 
CEPA, s. 274(1). 
116 A contravention may be punished on indictment by a fine up to CAD1 million, in the case of 
a first offence and in the case of subsequent offences to the same fine plus imprisonment for up 
to three years. If the offence is prosecuted on summary conviction, first time offenders may be 
punished by a fine up to CAD300,000 and subsequently by fine or imprisonment up to six 
months or both. 
117 Failure to do so may be punished on summary conviction by a fine up to CAD200,000 for a 
first offence and fine plus imprisonment up to six months for subsequent offences. 
118 Canada National Marine Conservation Areas Act, S.C. 2002, c. 18 [hereinafter NMCA]. 
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areas.119 Discharges in Arctic waters are enforced by Transport Canada by 
virtue of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act and the Arctic Shipping 
Pollution Prevention Regulations.120 Inter alia, the AWPPA prohibits all waste 
disposal into Arctic waters and permits the removal or destruction of any 
vessel, cargo, or bunkers when a serious pollution discharge occurs.121 
Curiously, and inconsistently, the AWPPA marine pollution sanctions appear to 
be less severe than those under the Canada Shipping Act, 2001, the Migratory 
Birds Convention Act, and Canadian Environment Protection Act.122 This 
situation is inconsistent with the particular needs and difficulties of protecting 
the sensitive Arctic marine environment. Consistent, if not tougher sanctions, 
are likely justifiable to enhance deterrence and heighten vessel operational 
standards in a remote region where pollution response and monitoring are 
extremely difficult, at best.  
It is appropriate to enquire to what extent this legislative activity has 
managed to harmonise overlapping statutes addressing vessel-source pollution 
and equally overlapping mandates of multiple federal departments. Although 
the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 streamlined the prosecution of offences by 
providing only for summary conviction offences, that new and innovative effort 
was not carried through to the Fisheries Act, Bill C-15, and the National 
Marine Conservation Areas Act. The latter two continue to provide for 
prosecution by indictment or summary conviction. Despite serious concerns in 
the shipping and legal community about Bill C-15’s vicarious strict liability 
offences and stiff sanctions, in practice most oil pollution offences have been 
prosecuted by Transport Canada under the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 or the 
Fisheries Act, rather than under the Migratory Birds Convention Act or the 
Canadian Environmental Protection Act.123 Since 1996, Environment Canada 
                                                 
119 This Act punishes anyone who disposes of pollutant substances in a marine conservation 
area; offenders may be punished by indictment to a fine up to CAD500,000 and on summary 
conviction to a fine of up to CAD100,000. NMCA, id., s. 24(1). 
120 Arctic Shipping Pollution Prevention Regulations, C.R.C., c. 354. 
121 It also permits seizure and forfeiture of ship and equipment in cases of pollution offences. 
AWPPA, n. 55 above, s. 23 et seq. 
122 The AWWPA provides for summary conviction offences punishable by a fine of up to 
CAD500,000 if the offender is an individual and CAD100,000 if the offender is a ship. Id., s. 
18. 
123 Marine Pollution Prevention, “Successful Prosecutions - Marine Pollution Prevention (2000–
2007)” (June 2007), available: <http://www.marinepollution-pollutionmaritime.gc.ca/eng/ 
succes_pros/prosecutions/menu.htm> (retrieved 10 November 2008) [hereinafter Successful 
Prosecutions]. See also statistics published by Environment Canada, Enforcement Branch, 
“National Statistics, Legal Activities Report, and Annual Reports for CEPA and FA,” available: 
<http://www.ec.gc.ca/alef-ewe/default.asp?lang=En&n=5C63F879-1> (retrieved 10 November 
2008) [hereinafter Environment Canada, “Statistics”]. 
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has charged only five vessels under the Migratory Birds Convention Act.124 Of 
these, only one was convicted under that Act.125 In the other cases, federal 
prosecutors preferred to proceed under the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 for 
various reasons.126 Further, to date only one master has been charged and fined 
for an oil pollution offence under the Canada Shipping Act, 2001.127 
Imprisonment has not been applied. Considering the political fanfare 
accompanying Bill C-15, in hindsight it appears that the principal effect has 
been to “send a message” to the shipping community and to assuage public 
concern. Government wanted to be seen to be “getting tough on polluters.” 
However, the significance of the Bill C-15 amendments should not be 
underestimated. The enhanced sanctions therein accompany the practice of 
Canadian courts to progressively increase the fines assessed for pollution 





                                                 
124 These were: Elm, Brandenburg, Atlantic Cartier, Donau Ore, and Sandviken. F. Wiese, 
Seabirds and Atlantic Canada’s Ship-Source Oil Pollution: Impacts, Trends, and Solutions 
(World Wildlife Fund, 2002), p. 23. 
125 The M/V Donau Ore. A fine of CAD30,500 was paid after the owners pleaded guilty. 
Environment Canada, “Government of Canada announces successful prosecution of marine oil 
polluter,” News Release (21 March 2001), available: <http://www.ns.ec.gc.ca/press/01-03-
21.html> (retrieved 10 November 2008). It will be noted that this conviction precedes the 
enactment of Bill C-15. Similarly, there appear to be no prosecutions for disposal at sea or 
ocean dumping offences under CEPA, and only one Environmental Protection Compliance 
Order (EPCO) issued. Environment Canada, “Statistics,” n. 123 above at CEPA 1999 for Fiscal 
Year 2004–2005. See also letter from Chuck Brumwell (Environment Canada, MGP Review 
Manager) to Paula Pacholek (7 November 2006) regarding Environment Canada’s Response to 
the Joint Review Panel’s Information Request JRP_R5_10, available: 
<http://www.ngps.nt.ca/Upload/Interveners/Environment%20Canada/061107_EC%20IR%20R
esponse%205%2010.pdf> (retrieved 10 November 2008). 
126 Wiese, n. 124 above. 
127 Successful Prosecutions, n. 123 above. Prosecution of F/V Hime Maru and its Master for Oil 
Record Book violations. See also Transport Canada, “Precedent Set as Marine Polluter Ordered 
to Pay Substantial Penalty,” News Release No. A001/05 (14 February 2005), available: 
<http://www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/releases/atl/2005/05-a001e.htm> (retrieved 10 November 
2008).  
128 Successful Prosecutions, id. See, e.g., most recent incidents with respect to the jack-
up oil rig Rowan Gorilla VI (prosecuted March 2007, CAD70,000 fine imposed, CAD35,000 
going to EDF), the M/V Point Valiant (prosecuted November 8, 2007, CAD18,000 fine 
imposed, CAD10,000 going to the EDF) and the M/V Cicero (prosecuted April 17, 2008, 
CAD15,000 fine imposed, CAD10,000 were paid in the EDF). The EDF adds a restorative 
component to vessel-source pollution sanctions. 
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17.6.2.2. Places of Refuge for Ships in Need of Assistance 
 
The international custom of granting refuge to ships in distress has been 
recognised in Canada at least since the 18th century.129 Canadian courts have 
enforced the international custom in a domestic context at least from the last 
quarter of the 19th century.130 In more recent times, ships in distress have been 
permitted to enter a Canadian port as a place of refuge only after their 
threatening condition was stabilised.131 This practice is consistent with that of 
other maritime states. While on the one hand recognising the humanitarian right 
of a ship in need of assistance to enter a place of refuge, Canada also takes the 
steps necessary to protect its interests, which may also include directing the 
ship to a particular location or possibly, in rare situations, to refuse admission. 
Canada supported efforts in the IMO to develop and adopt the 2003 Guidelines 
on Places of Refuge for Ships in Need of Assistance as an attempt to 
standardise international practice and the use of a risk assessment framework.132 
Following the adoption of the IMO Guidelines, Canada embarked on a lengthy 
process to develop the National Places of Refuge Contingency Plan (PORCP), 
which was finalised in 2007.133 Overall, the adoption of the PORCP in Canada 
was a relatively straightforward, non-contentious task, unlike the EU where 
public concern has delayed the adoption of a further directive in the Erika III 
package addressing this issue. The purpose of the PORCP is “to establish 
a national framework and approach which, with associated regional measures, 
will provide for an effective and efficient response to requests from ships in 
need of assistance seeking a place of refuge.” Based on the IMO Guidelines, 
                                                 
129 Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation between His Britannick Majesty and the United 
States of America, London, 19 November 1794, Parry, Vol. 52 (1969), Article 23, p. 243. For 
a historical assessment of the custom, see: A. Chircop, “Ships in Distress, Environmental 
Threats to Coastal States, and Places of Refuge: New Directions for an Ancien Regime?” Ocean 
Development and International Law 33, no. 2 (2002): 207–226, p. 208; and by the same author, 
“The Customary Law of Refuge for Ships in Distress,” in A. Chircop and O. Linden, eds, 
Places of Refuge for Ships: Emerging Environmental Concerns of a Maritime Custom (Leiden: 
Nijhoff, 2005), pp. 161–229. 
130 Canada (Attorney-General) v. MacDonell, (1883), 1 Ex. C. R. 99; Canada v. Valiant (The) 
(1914), 15 Ex. C. R. 392; May (The) v. Canada, [1931] S. C. R. 374; Queen City (The) v. 
Canada, [1931] S.C. R. 387; Canada (Attorney-General) v. Natalie S. (The), [1932] Ex. C. R. 
155; Rex v. Flahaut, [1935] 2 D.L.R. 685.  
131 The Eastern Power (leaking oil, 2000) and the M/V Kitano (fire onboard, 2001) entered 
ports of refuge in Atlantic Canada in such circumstances. “Canada to let leaking oil tanker in 
Newfoundland,” CBC News Update, 9 December 2000; “Ship ‘safe’ to enter harbour,” Halifax 
Chronicle Herald, 24 March 2001. 
132 Guidelines on Places of Refuge for Ships in Need of Assistance, IMO Assembly Resolution 
A.949(23), adopted on 5 December 2003, IMO Doc. A 23/RES.949, 5 March 2004. 
133 Transport Canada, National Places of Refuge Contingency Plan (PORCP) (3 July 2007).  
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but contextualised for Canada, the PORCP aims at promoting a consistent 
approach to a national response plan for Canada’s oceans. By identifying the 
responsible authority for providing assistance, Canada also appears to have 
implemented an IMO resolution accompanying the Guidelines concerning 
maritime assistance services.134 PORCP has been prepared by Transport 
Canada and within it the regional Marine Safety directors are expected to 
engage in a thorough and balanced risk assessment exercise as a basis for 
a timely decision on providing safe assistance to such ships, refuge as may be 
appropriate, and any related conditions.  
 
 
17.6.2.3. Pollution Liability and Compensation Regime 
 
Canada has long been a party to the CLC and IOPCF conventions, and has 
recently become a party to the LLMC. Canada is not yet a party to HNS and 
Bunkers, but neither convention is yet in force. Under Canadian law, 
a shipowner who is not covered by the CLC Convention (e.g., he is flying the 
flag of a non-party) is entitled to claim limitation of liability under the LLMC. 
This is similar to other jurisdictions. However, the two most significant aspects 
of Canada’s pollution liability and compensation regime, and a significant 
departure from the practice of EU Member States, are (1) standing 
arrangements with response organisations and (2) Canada’s long-standing Ship-
Source Oil Pollution Fund (SOPF).  
In its attempt to implement the polluter pays principle in relation to 
accidental oil pollution, Canada introduced a system of private responders 
across the country who would be equipped and certified as institutions with 
whom persons trading in oil in Canadian waters would be required to enter into 
a standing arrangement.135 The idea is that private response organisations would 
take on much of the response work of the Canadian Coast Guard, for a fee, and 
be available to respond promptly. They would operate under the authority of the 
master of the vessel that needs such assistance. Response organisations are 
entitled to claim their intervention costs as described further below. 
                                                 
134 Maritime Assistance Services, IMO Assembly Resolution A.950, adopted on 5 December 
2003, IMO Doc. A 23/Res.950, 26 February 2004. 
135 CSA 2001, n. 34 above, ss. 167–171. See further Response Organizations and Oil Handling 
Facilities Regulations, SOR/95-405; Transport Canada, Response Organizations Standards, TP 
12401 (Transport Canada, 1995), available: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/marinesafety/tp/TP12401/ 
menu.htm> (retrieved 10 November 2008). See generally, Transport Canada, Environmental 
Response Systems: Managing Canada’s Marine Oil Spill Preparedness and Response Regime, 
TP 14471 (Transport Canada, 2006), available: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/marinesafety/TP/ 
TP14471/menu.htm> (retrieved 10 November 2008). 
 
 560 
Originally established in 1973 as the Marine Pollution Claims Fund in 
response to the Arrow casualty, the SOPF was launched in 1989 and is probably 
the first compensation fund for marine oil pollution damage that is separate 
from, but complements, the international liability and compensation regime.136 
The SOPF interweaves with the CLC and IOPCF regimes, and to a lesser extent 
with the LLMC, which are implemented through the Marine Liability Act and 
regulations.137 The shipowner remains the first line of liability within the strict 
liability limits based on tonnage of the ship set out in the CLC, with the second 
line of liability consisting of the cargo-owners share in the form of the IOPCF, 
liability under which is also governed by the principle of strict liability.138 In 
a suit for compensation, the directors of the IOPCF and SOPF are joined to the 
suit by law.  
The SOPF interacts with this combined regime in a number of ways. 
First, the SOPF is responsible for the imported oil contribution calls which are 
at the basis of the IOPCF. This is in contrast to the other IOPCF state parties, 
who have legislated direct contributions from qualifying major oil importers in 
their jurisdictions.139 Second, the SOPF covers a wider range of spills than the 
international regime. Any ship qualifies (not just tankers), the oil covered is not 
restricted to persistent oils, and the polluting oil does not need to be carried as 
cargo. CLC is limited to cargo, bunker oil, and slops. Third, the claims covered 
are similar to the CLC and IOPCF, such as oil pollution damage, and cleanup 
costs (including reasonable preventive measures, actually incurred). Pollution 
damage and cleanup where the ship’s identity is not established, such as 
mystery spills are covered, unlike the CLC and IOPCF. Anticipatory and 
remedial expenses are covered.140 Economic loss claims are also covered, but 
                                                 
136 K. A. MacInnis, “The Canadian SSOPF Fund and Environmental Damage Assessment 
(EDA) in Canada,” in F. Maes, ed., Marine Resource Damage Assessment: Liability and 
Compensation for Environmental Damage (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), pp. 67–84. 
137 Marine Liability Regulations, SOR/2002-307 (8 August 2002). 
138 The only conduct that bars limitation is a “Personal act or omission of the owner, committed 
with the intent to cause the oil pollution damage or recklessly and with knowledge that the oil 
pollution damage would probably result.” CLC, n. 51 above, and Marine Liability Act, n. 35 
above. The “owner” includes shipowner, ship operator, and person who has possession or 
control of ship. 
139 Since 1989, the SOPF has contributed over CAD42 million in calls to the IOPCF. Ship-
Source Oil Pollution Fund (SOPF), The Administrator’s Annual Report 2006–2007 (Ottawa: 
SOPF, 2007), p. i. 
140 Costs and expenses incurred by the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, response organisation, 
any other person in Canada “in respect of measures to prevent, repair, remedy or minimise oil 
pollution damage from the ship, including measures taken in anticipation of a discharge of oil 
from that ship, to the extent that the measures taken and the costs and expenses are reasonable, 
and for any loss or damage caused by such measures,” and costs and expenses of the Minister 
or any person directed to take action or otherwise. Marine Liability Act, n. 35 above, s. 51. 
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they are limited to those connected with loss of income from fisheries 
(including sport fishing, and workers involved in handling and processing), 
aquaculture, and subsistence hunting in Canada. This is significantly narrower 
than the CLC and IOPCF parameters. In any case, claimants must show that 
they have no other right of recovery under any other law, and relational 
economic loss is not covered.141 Fourth, the SOPF is a fund of both first and last 
resort for Canadian claimants. Canadian claimants, except response 
organisations, may file a claim against the SOPF in an administrative 
procedure, so that they avoid the cumbersome judicial procedure of a suit 
against the shipowner and the IOPCF. The SOPF would then be subrogated into 
their claim against the shipowner and the IOPCF. Empowered as 
a commissioner under the Inquiries Act,142 the SOPF Administrator will 
investigate and assess all claims, and in practice rarely grants the entire amount 
claimed. The Administrator will make an offer to the claimant. If the claimant 
is dissatisfied, s/he will still have the right to appeal the Administrator’s 
decision to the Federal Court. 
Originally, the SOPF consisted of the receipts from a legally imposed 
levy of CAD 45.61 cents per metric ton of imported or exported oil in Canada. 
However, this levy was discontinued in 1976 as it was thought sufficient funds 
had accumulated to cover the claims that could arise. Although the idea of re-
introducing the levy has surfaced from time to time, it has not been re-
established. The SOPF has remained self-sufficient and has thus been able to 
pay off claims from its own growth. At the end of March 2008, the SOPF 
accumulated surplus stood at CAD376,425,567, with CAD152,110,416 being 
available for all claims from one major spill. This amount is significant when it 
is considered that it complements the CLC and IOPCF amounts. Thus a major 
spill that would necessitate combined compensation efforts would have 
CAD495,257,000 for claims. However, it is possible these funds might not be 
sufficient for a Prestige type scenario, and consequently it has been proposed 
that Canada should join the 2003 IOPC Protocol.143 Cleanup costs in the cases 
of Prestige and the earlier Exxon Valdez exceeded USD2 billion each; 
a Prestige scenario in Canada has been estimated at USD1.5 billion. Under the 
2003 protocol, combined CLC and IOPCF compensation amounts would be in 
                                                 
141 This is similar in all three funds, based on the pragmatic rule and principle of remoteness. 
See Landcatch v. IOPC Fund, 1999 SLT 1208 (Court of Session: Inner House (Second 
Division). 
142 Inquiries Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-11. 
143 Transport Canada, Maritime Law Reform Discussion Paper, TP 14370E (May 2005), 
available: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/pol/en/Report/tp14370/menu.htm> (retrieved 10 November 
2008), p. 14. 
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the region of CAD1.3 billion, thus bringing compensation levels closer to those 
of the United States’ Oil Pollution Act of 1990. 
In comparison, the EU does not have an EU-wide compensation fund, 
although it did obtain a higher level of compensation by successfully lobbying 
for the 2003 IOPCF Protocol. Nevertheless, some Member States, such as 





In general, and like EU Member States, Canada has pursued its shipping and 
marine environment protection interests within the global international 
maritime law regime serviced by IMO. Canada has been an active participant, 
frequently taking initiatives that have produced change in international 
regulations and standards. Canada has been able to do so even though it has not 
always embraced international conventions in a timely manner, if at all. 
However, its approach to the implementation of international standards has 
generally been solid: Canada has tended to legislate the amendments prior to or 
at the same time as it became a party to an international convention. 
In a contemporary setting, Canadian policy and regulation making for 
maritime safety and marine pollution, frequently under pressure from 
stakeholders and lack of resources, strives to produce results in an efficient 
(cost-effective) manner. Current policies are ostensibly geared towards the 
achievement of outcomes. It may be too soon to determine the extent to which 
intended results are being achieved, as the expected outcomes speak to 
medium- to long-term change. For successful results-based management, it 
should be expected that institutional efforts should be proactive. The Canadian 
experience appears to be more a mixture of proactive and reactive policy, 
institutional, and regulatory responses. The Canada Shipping Act, 2001 reform 
process can be seen as a proactive approach to legislative modernisation. 
Similarly, the PORCP constitutes proactive planning for the likelihood that 
ships in need of assistance that may pose environmental and other threats might 
require and be given refuge in Canadian waters. Differently, the complicated 
legislative response to oil pollution as a result of illegal discharges from ships is 
indicative of a reactive approach. It is arguable that reactive approaches are less 
efficient than well-thought-out proactive approaches which are spared 
development under the heat of the moment. In this example, the response to oil 
pollution has produced a fragmented, laborious, and inefficient approach to 
dealing with the problem. 
A handicap Canadian maritime administration has laboured under since 
the 1990s is the split of maritime responsibilities between two departments, and 
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especially the migration of the Canadian Coast Guard from the core of the 
maritime administration. The issue of conflicting institutional cultures has not 
been resolved, and will likely not be resolved. The approach to maritime 














Carry out any activity — including 
depositing, discharging or dumping any 
substance, or causing any substance to 
be deposited, discharged or dumped — 
that is likely to result in the 
disturbance, damage, destruction or 
removal of a living marine organism or 
any part of its habitat. 
 
(various Marine Protected Areas 
Regulations, made pursuant to s. 35(3) 
Oceans Act) 
Summary conviction: 
Fine max. $100,000 
 
Indictment: 






Failure to: (s. 183(1)) 
• Have arrangement with RO  
• Have procedures, equipment and 
resources for immediate use 
• Implement oil pollution prevention 
plan 
• Implement oil pollution emergency 
plan 
• Have equipment and resources at the 
site 
• Implement response plan 
• Obey direction resulting from 
a discharge or possible discharge of 
a pollutant 
Summary conviction: 
Fine max. $1 million 
and/or imprisonment 















Failure to: (s. 184(1)) 
• Have a declaration on board 
• Have a declaration on site 
• Have oil pollution prevention plan 
on site 
• Have oil pollution emergency plan 
on site 
• Have a response plan 
• Provide or arrange for training 
• Undertake and participate in 
activities to evaluate response plan 
• Provide information 
• Provide information officer 
considers appropriate 





maximum 1 year 
(s. 184(2)) 








175(1)(b)(c)(d) or (e) and 
176(1)(b)(c) or (d) 
• Illegal discharge of pollutant (s. 
187) 
 
• Failure to implement shipboard oil 
pollution emergency plan (s. 188) 
 
• Failure to proceed to a place and 
unload a pollutant (s. 189) 
 
• Contravention of the regulations 
made under this Part (s. 190) 
 
Regulations include: 
• Carrying of pollutants on board a 
vessel, whether as cargo or fuel 
• Control and prevention of pollution 
of the air by vessels 
• Reception facilities 
• Ballast water management 
• Design, construction, manufacture 
and maintenance of vessels or 
classes of vessels 
• Inspecting and testing 
• Obtaining certificates 
Summary conviction: 
• Fine maximum 
$1 million and/or 
imprisonment 
maximum 18 months 
(s. 191) 
Failure to obey directions: (s. 189) 
• To provide information  
• To proceed by a specified route 
• To proceed to a place and remain 
there 
Summary conviction: 
• Fine maximum 
$100,000 (s. 192) 
• Intentionally or recklessly causing a 
disaster that results in the loss of life 
or serious damage to the 
environment (s. 253(1)(a)) 
Indictment: 
• Fine (no limits) 
and/or imprisonment 




MBCA • Depositing or permitting harmful 
substances to be deposited  
 
in waters or an area frequented by 
migratory birds or in a place from 
which the substance may enter such 
waters or such an area (s. 5.1) 
Indictment: 
• Fine maximum 
$1 million and/or 
imprisonment 
maximum 3 years 













• Fine max. $300,000 
and/or imprisonment 
maximum 6 months  




(ss. 13(1.1), (1.11)) 
• Destruction or alteration of records 
• Omissions or false entries in records.  
• Obstruction of Game Officers 
• Providing false or misleading 
information (s. 5.2) 
Ibid. 
• Throwing prejudicial or deleterious 
substances (incl. ballast, coal ashes, 
stones) overboard 
 
in any river, harbour or roadstead, or in 
any water where fishing is carried on  
(s. 36(1)) 
Indictment:  
• First offence: fine 
maximum $1 million  
• Subsequent offence: 
fine maximum 
$1 million and/or 
imprisonment 
maximum 3 years 
 
Summary conviction: 
• First offence: fine 
maximum $300,000  




maximum 6 months 
(s. 40(2)) 
• Depositing or permitting deposit of 
deleterious substances of any type in 
water frequented by fish or in any 
place under any conditions where the 
deleterious substance or any other 
deleterious substance that results 
from the deposit of the deleterious 




• Failure to report deposits of 
deleterious substances that occur “out 
of normal course of events” (s. 38(4)) 
Summary conviction:  
• First offence: fine 
max. $200,000  
• Subsequent offence, 
fine max. $200,000 
and/or imprisonment 
maximum 6 months 
(s. 40(3)) 





• Failure to take reasonable measures to 
mitigate or remedy adverse effects of 
deposits regarding s. 38(4) (s. 38(5)) 
Ibid. 
• Failure to comply with direction of 
inspectors re deposit per s. 38(4) 
(s. 8(6)) 
Ibid. 
• Disposal or incineration of substances 
at sea 
• Importation or exportation of a 
substance for disposal at sea 
• Loading of a substance onto a ship for 
disposal at sea unless done with a 
permit (Part VIII Div. 3 – Disposal at 
Sea) 
Indictment: 
• Fine maximum 
$1 million and/or 
imprisonment 
maximum 3 years 
 
Summary conviction: 
• Fine maximum 
$300,000 and/or 
imprisonment 
maximum 6 months 
(s. 272) 
• Failure to prepare and implement 
environmental emergency plans in 
respect of listed substances (s. 199) 
 
• Failure to report and minimise 
environmental emergency in respect 
of listed substances (s. 201) 
Ibid. 
CEPA 
• Intentional or reckless damage to 
environment (causing disaster)  
(s. 274(1)(a)) 
Indictment: 
• Fine (no limit) and/or 
imprisonment 
maximum 5 years 
EC 
• Disposal of any substance  
(s. 14) 
 
within a marine conservation area 
except as authorised under CEPA 
 Indictment: 




• Fine maximum 
$100,000 (s. 24(1)) 
NMCA 
• Failure to mitigate degradation or 
injury caused by discharge or deposit 
of a substance capable of degrading 
the environment or injuring any 
animal, fish or plant within a marine 
conservation area (s. 29(1)) 
 
• Failure to comply with 
Minister’s irections (s. 29(2)) 
Ibid. (s. 24(1)) 
Parks Canada 
Agency 
AWPPA • Deposit of waste of any type (s. 4(1)) 
 
in the Arctic waters or in any place on 
Summary conviction: 







the mainland or islands of the Canadian 
Arctic under any conditions where the 
waste or any other waste that results 
from the deposit of the waste may enter 
the Arctic waters 
• Ship: fine maximum 
$100,000 (s. 18) 
• Failure to report deposit of waste or 
accident or other occurrence (s. 5(1)) 
• Failure to provide evidence of 
financial responsibility when required 
(s. 8(1)) 
Summary conviction: 
• Fine maximum 
$25,000 (s. 19(1)) 
• Navigating in shipping safety control 
zone without meeting standards 
• Navigating in shipping safety control 
zone contrary to regulations 
• Failure to comply with reasonable 
directions given by pilot 
• Failure to comply with orders given 
by pollution prevention officer in 
response to deposits or threat of 
deposit 
• Failure to report deposit (master of 
ship) 
• Obstructing PPO or making false 
statements (master of ship) 
Summary conviction: 
• Fine maximum 
$25,000 (s. 19(2)) 
• Obstructing or hindering a pollution 
prevention officer (other than master) 
• Making false or misleading 
statements to a pollution prevention 















Key: CEPA, Canadian Environmental Protection Act; CSA, Canada Shipping Act, 2001; DFO, 
Department of Fisheries and Oceans; EC, Environment Canada; FA, Fisheries Act; MBCA, 
Migratory Birds Convention Act; MOU, memorandum of understanding; NMCA, Canada 
National Marine Conservation Areas Act; PRO, pollution response officer; PPO, pollution 




Workshop Discussion Summary 
 





Moira McConnell, Marine & Environment Law Institute, Dalhousie University 
(making a joint presentation on behalf of Lotta Viikari, Faculty of Law, 
University of Lapland); Malgorzata Nesterowicz, European Maritime Safety 
Agency; and Aldo Chircop and Eric Machum, Marine & Environment Law 
Institute, Dalhousie University, presented their papers focussing on invasive 
species and ships’ ballast water, and maritime safety and vessel-source 
pollution control from both Canadian and EU perspectives. 
Discussion centered on the issue of transport of alien species, including 
the unaddressed issue of transport of introduction of alien species to land as a 
result of maritime transport (e.g., introduced beetles from wooden shipping 
platforms). It was agreed that we must also consider the issue from the 
perspective of what we are exporting, and identify means of reducing the 
transport of invasive species from this perspective. 
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